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POLICY PROPOSALS
American Political and Military Response

Patience may well be a virtue that goes unrewarded
when practiced by political leaders. The use of force and
its antecedents, the threat to and capability of use are
hallmarks of superpower status globally and even of the
petty principalities who may be number 3.

The distinction

between super - and regional powers rests but upon their
capacities to extend their reach.

Conceived of as concentric

circles, superpower influence may radiate globally while
regional powers extend but within limited radiants.
Since their reach is so extensive, superpowers tend
to assume that all areas within reach are subject to control.
Such assumptions are seductively attractive, tempting
assertions of claim and success for events unaffected such
as the asserted success of US policy in the revolution
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against Sukarno and Americah prowess at Sadat 1 s eviction of
Russian personnel.
Havlng reached s~perpower status following World War I I, the
US was virtually alone until the USSR began expanding her role
in .the m~d 1960 1 s.

Starting rather hesitantly with the Truman

Doctrine (1947) and the Containment pol icy (1974), we followed
with North American Treaty Organization (NAT0,1949),

The Korean

War (1950-4) demonstrated the fragility of America 1 s domain which
was subsequently shored up under Secretary Dulles• alliance
expansion pol icy.

NATO was to be cloned as Central Treaty Organ-

ization (CENTRO), Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and
Australia, New Zealandand the US (ANZUS) and myriadic siblings
in the guise of bilateral alliances and myriadic siblings in the
guise of bilateral all lances and mutual assistance pacts (with
Japan, Taiwan, Israel, South Korea, Iran, etc.).
Russian reluctance to challenge US pol icy directly
provided the United States with a clear road devoid of
obstructions.

US pol icy was only to be limited by logistical
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requirements and latent nationalism in the affected areas,
which was hardly an effective barrier to US military power.
Officials of the Eisenhower

administration learned that

Soviet power could be contained by (the threat to use)
American nuclear superiority while demonstrably weak
conventional military forces were sufficient for the tasks
(

of intervening in distant places. Suez (1956), Lebanon (1958),
and Iran (1954) proved that a relatively small mobile force
could regulate the defense perimeter to the end that America's
strategic and military position was projected and protected
cheaply and bloodlessly.
This is not to say that there were not frustrations:
France's refusal to ratify her own proposal for creating a
European Defense Community; the debacle of French policy in
Indochina, Indian hostility to creating a South Asian Treaty
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Organization and Egyptian opposition to a Middle East Treaty
Organization were signal defeats of US pol icy.

But we

recovered from each setback with what was considered ski11fu1
aplomb.

We virtua11y restored Vietnam to antebellum status

replacing the French; the Baghdad Pact replaced the projected
Mldd1e East Treaty Organization (METO) only to be replaced by
CENTO headquartered in Turkey.

While the plan had been to

forge an Arab equivalent to NATO, no Arab states joined. ITraq
withdrew following her revolution (1958), resulting in the
beheading of King Faisal and his Prime Minister Nuri-as~Said]
The projected South Asia Treaty Organization was to be a
NATO-1 ike entity organized around Nehru's India •. As SEATO,
its 1 inch pin was Pakistan leading Nehru to conclude that
it was targeted against India, not Russia or China.
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EDC's defeat followed ifl1llediately upon Dulles'

11

Agon~zing

Reappraisal" speech and helped pave the way for nationalist
resurgence in Europe.

Coupled with the Anglo-French debacle

in Suez, the end to French and British imperial designs were
\._

hastened by an American policy which had not set out to
discourage those designs.
Throughout this period (1953-60), United States military
capability for engaging in low intensity conflict was
_declining at the same time that American ,nuclear superiority
was increasing apparently~

But appearances can be deceptive

and we tended to deceive ourselves as being uniquely safe
/

from serious challenge because of our overwhelming nuclear
superiority in terms of instruments and delivery systems.
That the Russians were not all that far behind us was made
crystal clear with the launching of Sputnik in 1957
demonstrating an ability to better us in space and
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signalling an end to America's unique role.
The Kennedy administration took office in 1961 with
the self-proclaimed mandate to restore US prominence (close
the 11 missile gap 11 ) and to develop the technology and skill
for (1) combatting Soviet 11 indirect aggression" by means of
counterinsurgency warfare, and (2) promoting liberation wars
to build nations who would be friendly to the U.S. Without
shirking our burgeoning nuclear stockpiles, the administration
launched a massive space program (NASA,et al.) increased

--

expenditures for conventional weapons and forces, initiated
combat operations in South Vietnam, created the Green Berets

(patterned after the French Algerian forces), developed its
laboratory for counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam, undertook
the task of building a new nation in South Vietnam and
launched the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. This litany
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only recounts some of the developments in 1961.
The missile crisis in Cuba (1962) proved to the
administration that it was on the right track. The
administration spread the word that had the gauntlet
been thrown by the Russians during the previous
administration, the US could not have mounted a blockade,
that American military might had been in such a low state
of readiness as to preclude chances for a limited response
to limited challenges.
Eisenhower's reliance upon nuclear deterrence
posited threat escalation to the nuclear threshold to
compel Soviet acquiescence .to limits set by the U.S.
Thus John Foster Dulles became known for his brinksmanship
and the favored account of his term was titled
Duel at the Brink.

11

Brinksmanship became the fashionable
11
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topic of discourse among policy and academic elites
including mathematically sophisticated games of chicken
and multiple prisoners dilemmas demonstrating the choices
available given limited information about and adversary's
choice.
While it is still too early to size up the Carter
administration, it might be said that each US administration
I

since World War II was interventionist. But the style and!

i

I

i

mode of the interventions varied significantly as did the

i
II

scale of various interventions.

If style, mode, scale and

I

I
I

I
loci for interventions differ, it might be quite difficult

l

to generalize intelligently from the different cases.

It

may well be that like "war 11 and "peace", intervention is too
;;

broad a term to be studied with precision.
Comparing one administration's interventions to
another is somewhat analagous to comparing apples and oranges.
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Conditions change over time sufficiently to make each
case almost unique; however, it may be possible to discern
trends.

It is quite important to bear in mind that foreign

pol icy makers may be accountable for· wh.at they do, not what
they say they do, especially what they say they do while
!

I

dofng.

Official statements made at the time of an incident

always must be considered self-serving, misleading and
dissembling.

Such statements are public relations events,

not analytically meaningful documents.

If one wishes to

study Truman - Acheson foreign policy, one must examine
what they did not what they claimed to do.

Examining

speeches may be rhetorically interesting; it rarely tells
much about events.
From the standpoint of their rhetoric, presidents
from Truman through Ford exhibited remarkable similarities;
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however, the similarities tend to fade when the rhetoric
is put aside. The triumph of Truman-Acheson policy, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization was largely a
European creation (ex Brussels Pact) designed to compel
American participation in European renascence to (1) deter
the Soviet Union, (2) pol ice Germany, and ( 3) .guarantee
an American hegemony which was expected to be more
beneficent than any likely European hegemony.

The Truman

Doctrine, stripped of its rhetorical flourishes becomes merely
the first in a long line of military and economic assistance
programs entered into by the US in succeeding decades.

The

fading away of Greek communist activity resulted more from
serendipity than from American acuity.·

And even the

Marshall Plari now appears to have accompanied European
recovery rather than to have caused it.
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Aside from Korea, which would have been an
unqualifiedly successful intervention had the Chinese not
been drawn in, Truman 1 s interventions had largely indetenninate
influence upon events.

Eisenhower's policies were similarly

indetenninate save for Guatemala, Iran and Suez.

In Guatemala,

leftists were overthrown and have been denied a governing
role since their ouster in 1954. -_ ""~..

In Iran, the ouster

of Moharmned Mossadegh may have contributed to more recent
events rather significantly. Twenty-five years later,
ouster of Mossadegh's protege, Bakhtiar, was certainly
not an outcome preferred by the US to Khomeini.

Restoring

the Shah to his throne in 1954 was anachronism tri1.DTiphant.
That the Shah was overthrown eventually was not remarkable;
his survival for 25 years was.

King Khaled, Prince Fahd

and the shiekhs of Kuwait, Dubai, Abu Dhabi~ et _tlr,, should
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tremble for they too are anachronistic for this epoch.
In Suez, we intervened against'two allies (Britain and
France) and a client state (Israel) that was promised far more
than we would or could deliver.

Israel 1 s voluntary withdrawal

from Sinai rested upon American guarantees of free navigation
through the straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. As Israel
should nave Known, such guarantees are rhetorical flourishes,
not poltcy·indicators. They are statements of hope, not
intent. The effect upon Britain and France may have been
even more serious than upon the Middle East.
Suez proved the vacuousness of the much vaunted
"special relationship" of Britain and the U.S.
Prime Minister Anthony Eden's political position was
destroyed, and the Anglo-French attempt to undermine
Nasser's control of Egypt was frustrated by the American
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government which had encouraged it. The French government
survived out not for long. The coup~ grace had been
deltvered to the Fourth Republic.

The seeds of what was

ta oe called Gaullism were planted, to be fertilized by
. the General in 1958, since which time France has been a
most contentious ally.
The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations came
ta oe dominated by American involvement in Indochina, which
must oe described as having been counterproductive since
South Vietnam has been absorbed by the North which also
controls communist Laos and Cambodia successors to the
neutral governments in place when our interventions began.
One ts tempted to suggest that the domino principle was
stood on its head.

Only the intervention in the Dominican

Republtc can be proclaimed an unqualified success. Our
intervention in Cuba (1961 and 1962) helped to solidify
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Castro's position not weaken it.
Real changes occurred in Soviet foreign policy since
the war.

Until his death, Stalin pursued a very sober,

conservative policy resulting in a net withdrawal of Russian
military forces (Iran, 1946, and Korea, 1948). Stalin avoided
intervening in Greece, Turkey, and most significantly
Yugoslavia. To be sure, the coup de Prague in 1948 was
aided and abetted by the USSR but Soviet troops had remained
in occupation since the war and Soviet hegemony was
acknowledged de facto by the Western powers.
The Russians did intervene in East Perlin (1953),
Poland (1956) and Hungary (1956); however, each was in the
sphere of influence conced~d by the West.

Significantly,

Albania's split did not result in Soviet military
involvement despite the bitterness of the dispute.

And

the Russians did not intervene in China despite the potential

Page fifteen

danger posed by Chinese disaffection.
The Cuban missile incident (1962) was the watershed.
For the first time, the USSR intervened in a place which was
not only distant but in an American sphere. While they
failed to obtain bases or station missiles in _Cuba, the
Russians secured American acquiescence in Cuban territorial
integrity and sovereignty. Certainly, this was the primary
goal of her intervention.

Kennedy's triumph was shared by

Khrushchev.
It remains somewhat unclear whether the Russians led
or were pushed by their Warsaw Pact allies to intervene in
Czechoslovakia in 1968; however, the outcome was unambiguous.
Dubcek's regime offered no resistance and was replaced by a
more compliant government.
Soviet interventions beyond her sphere have had rather
more indeterminate results.

Soviet military personnel were
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evicted from the Sudan (1971), Egypt (1972) and Somalia (1977)
and one might well be presumptuous to assume that .the
Russian-Cuban roles in Ethiopia and Angola are unambiguous.
It is too soon to conclude that Neto and Mengitsu are 11 safely 11
in the Russian camp; the1 may discover, as Somalia and Egypt
earlier, that Russian/Cuban support is dispensable.

Indeed,

it is most unlikely that Russian influence will overcome
national pressures in any of the areas affected by Soviet
and/or Cuban troops. Afghanistan, South Yemen, Iraq, Syria,
Ethopia, Angola, etc., are ruled by nationals who will place
their national self-interest above Russian or Cuban or any
non-national interest if push comes to shove.
If the results of intervention are as indeterminate as
this review indicate, why do nations intervene in the
affairs of other nations? The possible range of answers
might be unlimited, but some may include:
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(1)
·•

Modified machismo--states intervene to reassure
themselves and others that they are· there, with
little concern for matters of cost, benefit, risk.
The Mayaguez Affair is an example.

(2) Capability--states intervene because they can
intervene.

US in South Vietnam in 1961 is an

example.
(3)

Inverted machismo--states intervene to deprive an
adversary of a modified machismo intervention.
Dominican Republic, 1965, for example.

(4)

Displaced animosity---states intervene against a
target to punish or frustrate an adversary not
participating in the fighting.

China in Vietnam,

1~79, to discredit the USSR.
(5)

Control--states intervene to determine specific
political choices in the target.

USSR in Hungary, 1956.
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(6)

Deflect dissent--states intervene to deflect criticism
from political leadership to an adversary. Mayaguez
also illustrates this point.
cl

(7)

Camouflage--states proclaim hostile intervention to
justify nretalfation".

North Vietnam's "attack" on

the Maddox and the Turner Joy in 1964, for example,
resulting in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
Low intensity conflicts (limited wars) are risky
enterprises for all parties because they easily become
protracted and they may become unlimited. The conflict
can become protracted because the adversaries may not be
· exhausted by the struggle.

US-North Vietnam 1961-74 and

Israel--Egypt, Syria, Jordan, et 21_., since 1948 are
examples.

It was apparent to many that the Vietnam war

as fought from 1965-68 or after 1969 coul,d have continued
indefinitely with indeterminate results - neither side
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winning or losing.

Resources available to the US and to

Vietnam woul~ have permitted indefinite continuance so long
as the conflict remained limited.
Similarly, resources available to Israel and her Arab
adversaries permit an equally protracted conflict.

Left to

their own resources, the parties wotild long since have
exhausted their resources and would have been more
restricted in the level of fire-power available.
Indefinite Russian and American resupply promoted renewed
and intensified hostilities.
The homily that all wars must end is but a homily.

It

is not accurate historically to conclude that wars always
result in an end that permits maintenance of the integrity
of each adversary in whole or in part. Wars may result in
the virtually complete eradication of a nation or even of
a civilization.
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Low intensity conflicts may even be more dangerous
for superpowers than for less powerful targets. This
follows because the superpower projects its global role and
may be drawn into multiple conflicts.

And some multiple

may deplete resources available for prosecution of such wars,
or propel escalation to unlimited warfare which would be
profoundly unsatisfactory.

Given American predispositions

to assume that the Russians ordered or seduced North Korea
to invade South Korea, had China chosen the moment to
attack India and the USSR to invade Yugoslavia, American
officials might well have concluded that the U.S. must go
to war against the Soviet Union.

Committing large military

forces to war in Korea and Vietnam heightened American
vulnerability to hostile actions to which the response would
likely have been inadequate or excessive.
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It is always dangerous for political leaders to
provide adversaries with options that may back them into
corners. This is why it is always better for superpowers
to find proxies to front for them. Thus, the USSR could
terminate its support for Angola with little embarrassment
for Cuba.

Indeed, Cuban forces could ( hence might) be

abandoned at scattered points in Africa if such abandonment
were necessary or useful for Soviet purposes. Such action
by the USSR would be consonant with her status as a
superpower and with the use of the Cuban proxy. Obviously,
abandonment would not occur capriciously or frivolously,
but if and only if, such abandonment were deemed necessary
by reason of Soviet national interests. Numerous illustrations
of such abandonment may be cited; including: Soviet abandonment
of communist parties in China in the 1920's and in Western

;;

'
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Europe during the Nazi~Soviet pact in 1939, Iranian
abandonment of the Kurds in Iraq (1977), and Yugoslav
abandonment of Greek communist guerrillas in 1947.
Abandonment should not be viewed as dysfunctional; ·
indeed, inherently reserving the option to abandon a proxy
justifiei the use. After all, the Russians were not
fighting in Angola and in the Ogaden, Cubans were.

The

Russians can assume a posture of innocence with some degree
of credibility, low though it might be. Were a major Islamic
rebellion in Central Asia to occur, the Russians might find
that they need their transport, supplies and personnel at
home.

Given short enough notice, returning Cubans might

have to seek spaces on commercial flights, or seek alternative
means of returning home. Their position in Africa would likely
become tenuous relatively swiftly. Obviously, Cuba is aware

..
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of the risks involved in playing her role and considers them

,.

worth taking.

It would be unseemly to suggest that Castro

might underestimate his risks.
In light of considerations advanced earlier in this
paper, what lessons pertain to American policy as we enter
l

the ei"ghties?

Neith~r relatively nor absolutely has

US military power been diminished significantly despite Iran,
Vietnam and diverse African developments.

Perceptions of

American power have diminished as has the bluster and
swagger of American deportment.

Nurtured by Truman's and

Dulles' oratory and Kennedy's adventurism, domestic and
foreign publics tended to view the US as well nigh omnipotent
and invincible. Czechoslovakia, China, and Korea should have
proved the lie to such perceptions but it took Vietnam and
Iran to make the point and US prestige plummetted from its

.
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fancied position.

...

It had to fall, only the timing was in

doubt.
Exaggerated notions of a state's influence and control
interfere in planning, implementing, assessing and understanding
its foreign policy. Thus the Truman Doctrine has been adjudged
an astounding success even though such claims are baseless and
ill-informed.

It has suited presidents and satraps to pay

homage to the claim, and the myth continued to grow until
the success became part of conventional wisdom, to find its
place alongside NATO'S salvation of a Europe that likely was
not even threatened by Stalin's hordes. Similarly, we
conceded Russian monolithic control over East Europe before
such control was "established". And we then exaggerated
such influence by thinking of the East European states as
satellites, a rather preposterous notion politically.
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The limitations of US policy facing the US today are
.,.

not different appreciably from those that faced it in the
fifties and sixties.

Controlling events in one's own

jurisdiction is neither easy nor well executed nonnally.
Johnson, Nixon, Khrushchev and the Shah 1earned this 1es son
but recently. Controlling events abroad, beyond the reach
of jurisdiction is a will-0 1"-·the-wisp, a fantasy, an
invitation to self-deception. American policy can exert
some influence upon foreign leaders but usually such
influence is so slight as to be difficult to detect.

Else

the US could compel Israel and Egypt to make choi ce,s they
otherwise would not make. And Somoza would depart Nicaragua.
~

Perhaps a sign of maturity, experience has finally

demonstrated that US policy is not so controlling or
influential as we have pretended it to be. Such a lesson
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can have salutary effects if we elevate our claims a little
lower and pretend not what we cannot achieve.

If our newly

found humility is excessive, adventures may prove too tempting
to resist in order that we may restore pride and prestige.
American power is best projected indirectly -- indirection
makes possible the optimization of flexibility while offering
some protection against overextension and overexposure.
Maintaining flexibility .is of paramount importance in
political situations if actors are to be in control of
events.

Politics is an electic process, an ad hoc decision

process wherein occasionally reliable information competes
with much which is less reliable and more that is unreliable
(noise).

[Doctrine, cant and shibboleths have little relevance

to the decision process.

Thus, Yugoso]avia's communist status

did not impair US aid program when relations with the USSR were
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severed.

Predetermined responses to unanticipated events are

not political but ideological responses.

Foreign policy concerns,

in large measure, dealing with unanticipated events.] Well-informed
choices are difficult to make because reliable information is
so scarce. Such scarcity makes it necessary to maximize
flexibility thereby permitting modifications of policy to fit
events.

The Soviet shift from Somalia to Ethopia may prove to

have been an adroitly flexible respons.e to shifting events but
also might have resulted from inadequate or unreliable information.
Somalia's eviction of Soviet personnel may also prove to have been
adroit or inept.
It is quite easy for states to overextend their resources
by intervening in diverse disputes.

Relatively, all resources

are scarce and should be managed prudently, else the
consequences may prove more disadvantageous to the intervenor
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than to the intervened. Had Nationalist Chin-ese troops
played the role taken by the U.S. in Vietnam, costs for
the US would have been substantially reduced even if the
US had provided financial and material support.

Most

American goals in Vietnam could have been accomplished
better by Chinese than American forces.

More important,

policy failures which were legion and probably inevitable
would not have been borne directly by the U.S. and that
will-o' .. the-wisp, prestige, would not have plunmeted
quite so radically. And, of course, shocks to the
American economy and 11 psychen would have been reduced
significantly.
The implication for Taiwan would have been significant
but would have resulted from Nationalist policy and would
have had less profound significance for world politics.
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US economic and military resources would have been
husbanded and flexibility maintained. As things developed,
the US became ensnared in a trap largely self-constructed
leading to a general buffeting by events beyond American
control. We manoeuvered ourselves into an indefinite war
that virtually monopolized our attention and diminished
our resolve. Of course a proxy war by ROC forces might well
have drawn Communist Chinese direct involvement thereby
intensifying the war. The rational choice for the PRC would
have been to remain aloof, permitting the Nationalist Chinese
to become mired in South Vietnam as the US eventually sank
into the bog.
In addition to maintaining flexibility and avoiding
overextension, states should avoid overexposure. An
empirical term, overexposure is used here to mean the
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repetitive use of political devices which repetition
generates expectations for specific performance that may
be inappropriate.

The US readiness to dispatch military

and economic aid to Greece and Turkey led to mutual
aisistance agreements eventually with 42 states in the
Dulles era. States such as Iran, Korea, Israel, et al.,
were encouraged to build relatively massive military
establishments without regard to the fact that such
investment of and consumption of resources tends to
foster inflation and destabilize local economies and
politics.

And overexposure has made the US hostage to

local officials who may seek aid for private as well as
political gain.

During the Dulles era, the Shah was

wont, occasionally, to threaten to turn to the Soviets
if the US refused his requests.

Tom Mboya, then

Vice President of Kenya, told the author that third
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world leaders (then still called underdeveloped) had but
to. invoke the Communist spectre to obtain what they wished
from the US. More recently, states have developed expectations
of American intervention or, at least, assumed the right to
threaten American intervention when it suited their policies.
Thus the credibility of American intervention policy rested
upon American willingness to intervene on call. While this
did not really occur, it encouraged foreign and domestic
governments and publics to believe that intervention would
occur upon demand.

Congressional initiatives, such as the

War Powers Act, and Carter's articulated nonintervention
policies (particularly concerning Iran, Ogaden and Vietnam)
appear to reverse policies pursued by previous administrations.
The shock of US nonperformance would have had less noticeable
impact had images

of

American omniscience not been so overblown.
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Obviously, the US

cannot permit its credibility to

be determined by client or target states else the concept
of credibility becomes incredible itself. The notion that
client or target states can determine American response
actually stands logic on its head because it makes the US
the client or servant to the client as master.

Pavlov's

dogs dertainly did not put Pavlov through their paces,
quite the reverse.

After the Treaty of Paris and during

Watergate, Kissinger's importunings about US credibility
implied that the test of credibility is exertion of such
force as clients may require or demand.

Kissinger moved

far beyond the lengthy strides made by his immediate
predecessors who failed to distinguish between allied and
non-allied states.

Dean Rusk proclaimed South Vietnam an

ally when no alliance had oeen executed causing chagrin
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among some of our allies.
It ·;s important to bear in mind that an alliance is
quite a specific instrument of policy. An alliance is a
limited set of states acting in concert at a given time to
enhance their military security against a co11111on enemy.
alliance is a contractual

An

arrangement entered into by the

parties according to their constitutional practices; requiring
from the US approval by at least two-thirds vote of the US
Senate.

No alliance substitutes for, or supersedes any

constitutional practice of a member, nor does it diminish
sovereign independence or national self-detennination.
Typically, alliance treaties provide that in the event of
· an enemy attack, each allied party will respond as it deems
appropriate according to its national decision making
practices.

No alliance diminishes discretionary powers

by government officials in crisis situations.

Official
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pronouncements justifying actions by reference to alliance
are always dissembling. Such statements are designed to
blunt criticism by pretending limited choice.

Rusk's statements

that we had to assist South Vietnam else we betrayed an ally
was untrue in that there ~as no alliance and if there had
oeen, US options were still free.
If alliances or client state dependency constrained
US policy so effectively the US policy would be more· system
/

determined than are most states, and that would be logically
untenable. As a superpower the US is system dominant, not
system dependent and US policymakers act appropriately even
if they do not always speak appropriately.

Appropriate

behavior requires maximizing discretionary power and avoiding
entanglements that diminish flexibility or that deplete
resources.

US military power, or Soviet military power for

that matter, are most effective instruments of policy when
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held in reserve.

Large scale commitment of military forces

to low-intensity conflicts signals a failure of pol icy.
Vietnam had serious consequences for the US not because
South Vietnam became communist or because of the unification
of Vietnam, but because of the economic and political-military
costs for the US.

Principal economic consequences have been

evidenced by US inflation and the dilemma of the US dollar.
In the pQlitical-military sphere, North Vietnam demonstrated
that the emperor indeed had no clothes or at least only
rather transparent clothes.

Emperors' raimants are always

superficial artifacts but wise emperors do not expose
themselves in public.
The lessons of the past do not always enlighten future
behavior; frequently they provide a guide to future responses.
We tend to respond as we or our predecessors responded to
similar or analogous situations in the past;

not as we might

have responded rationally had perfect information been
available.

Despite their mocking of incumbents while
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campaigning for office, presidents and their entourages tend
to mimic those who served before them.
Learning from the past requires scrupulous honesty in
evaluating prior events and in drawing analogies.

Our

historical lessons must be free from cant and our analogies
must contain isomorphic behavioral properties.

The Truman

Doctrine did not stem the tide of Soviet expansion in Greece
but coincided with Stalin's opposition to communist Greek
insurrection.

And the experience of the Vietnamese boat

people bears 1 ittle resemblance to the plight of the Jews in
Nazi occupied Europe.

Had Hitler driven the Jews into the

sea, many more would likely have been rescued.
Learning correctly from the past is no more difficult
than erroneous learning; it requires investigation nurtured
by skepticism.

We must learn to distinguish what really

happened from conventional wisdom which is but rarely ever
wise.

